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NOTE
USING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO
RESHAPE AMERICAN LEGISLATION OF STATE
OFFICIAL ENGLISH LAWS
Jenning Kohlberger
The protection of the Constitution extends to all,-to those who
speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the
tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced
by methods which conflict with the Constitution,-a desirable end
cannot be promoted by prohibited means.'
I. INTRODUCTION
To the surprise of two out of three Americans, English is not the of-
ficial language of the United States.2  Cognizant of the bond between lan-
guage and religious and cultural freedoms, the Framers of the Constitution
chose not to designate an official state language so that no restriction on
these freedoms might be implied.3 Thus, the United States Constitution does
not provide for an official language.4
Yet today, without an official language decree, ninety-eight percent
of our residents speak English well or very well. 5 The United States is a
nation that is predominantly monolingual.6 Still, a movement to formalize
1. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
2. Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 293 (1989) (citing Carelli, Survey: Most Think English is Official U.S. Language, Assoc. Press,
Feb. 14, 1987).
3. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 928 n.10 (9th Cir. 1995), vacating as moot
sub nom. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (citing Heath, Language and Politics
in the United States, in LINGUISTICS AND ANTHROPOLOGY 267, 270 (1977)). When the Continental Congress
issued publications of the Constitution, it was distributed in English, German and French. Juan F. Perea,
Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism and Official English, 77
MINN. L. REv. 269, 271-81 (1992).
4. DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION 1 (1990).
5. Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Note, Language Minorities: Forgotten Victims of Discrimination?, 1 I GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 747, 757 (1997) (citing Califa, supra note 2, at 293).
6. BARON, supra note 4, at 192-93.
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English as the official language has simmered for over two hundred years.7
Innocuous at first blush, this movement threatens the rights of nine percent
of the U.S. population, or 25.8 million foreign-born residents! It is esti-
mated that this population may increase to twelve percent by 2010.9
At its most basic level, language is a "tool of communication."' 0 But
language, unlike race or gender, eludes legal characterization. 1" Whether
language more adequately fits the classification of culture, ethnicity, or be-
havior stumps the formulation of a legal construct. 12  In some cases, lan-
guage serves as a link to culture; 13 for others, it acts as a means by which
people identify themselves; 14 for still others, language is a behavioral trait
that is mutable.' 5 For the foreign-born population that currently boasts 25.8
million, the critical right to one's language has yet to be established in the
United States. 16
The mere pronouncement of English as the official language of the
state does not violate the Constitution.17 For the government to craft classi-
fications based on language is not necessarily unfavorable.18 In the past, the
United States Supreme Court has ruled that individuals have language rights
in several contexts, including the right to converse in any language, the right
to language outside of the workplace, the right to waive legal privileges in
one's language, and the right to language at the voting booth. 19 But for the
government to formally advance the English language by requiring that all
government-related matters be conducted in the official state language re-
mains disputed.20 As the number of states amending their state constitutions
to include Official English legislation grows, 2' courts are attempting to de-
7. Id. at xiii.
8. Knapp, supra note 5, at 758.
9. Id.
10. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward A Comprehensive Theory of
Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (2001).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 134.
13. Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of S.E. Jud. Dist., Los Angeles County, 838 F.2d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 1988),
vacating as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
14. Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 133-34.
15. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
16. Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 133.
17. Cecilia Wong, Note, Language is Speech: The Illegitimacy of Official English After Yniguez v. Arizo-
nans for Official English, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 277, 285 (1996).
18. Andrew P. Averbach, Note, Language Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause: When is
Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REv. 481,483 (1994).
19. BILL PIATT, ,ONLY ENGLISH? 127-35 (1990).
20. Wong, supra note 17.
21. In 1996, only twenty-two states had enacted Official English laws. Id. at 278. By 2000, three more
states had joined the list. Christian A. Garza, Case Note, Measuring Language Rights Along a Spectrum, 110
YALE L.J. 379 n.2 (2000) (citing Katherine Kapos, Education Board Demurs on English-Only, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Apr. 12, 2000, at Bi, available at 2000 WL3757810).
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cide if such legislation is constitutionally valid.22 At the heart of the debate
is to what extent the government should protect the rights of language mi-
norities.23
Within the scope of regulations and certifications promulgated by
state administrative agencies, this paper seeks to identify the problem that
courts face today in determining the range of linguistic rights. Part I exam-
ines the justifications for an Official English policy. Part II reviews the con-
texts in which language rights have been established in the past. Part III
assesses the untidy area of language rights in cases involving social service
and administrative agencies. Part IV looks to an Irish model, comparing its
judicial approach as well as its legislature's acts, for a solution to our domes-
tic problem. Lastly, Part V maintains that for language rights to be acknowl-
edged and honored, state legislatures may find guidance in the Irish para-
digm.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH
Most recently, a small group of activists twenty years ago sought to
promote English as the official language by forming the single-issue group,
U.S. English. 24 As of 1995, its membership had expanded to 450,000.25 It,
along with several subsequent English-advocacy groups, has pursued legisla-
tion that would add to the U.S. Constitution an English Language Amend-
26
ment that would declare English as the official language of the country.
Given that an amendment to the federal constitution would require a two-
thirds majority in both houses of Congress and ratification by three-fourths
of state legislatures, the likelihood such an amendment would pass is dubi-
ous. 27 At the state level, however, amending a state constitution demands
overcoming fewer and less complicated barriers. As a result, half of the
country carries Official English laws in their constitutions.28
Proponents of Official English laws in these states justify the
amendment on several levels. Groups like U.S. English begin by first recog-
nizing that the citizens of the United States are "remarkably diverse in ori-
22. Carmen B. Tigreros, Note, Constitutional Challenges to Official English Legislation, ST. JOHNS' J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 295, 296-97 (1996).
23. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 928 (9th Cir. 1995), vacating as moot sub
nom. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997); Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (1 1th
Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
24. RAYMOND TATALOVICH, NATIVISM REBORN? 10 (1995).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. BARON, supra note 4, at 24-25.
28. See supra note 21.
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gin, race, lifestyle, ethnicity, religion, and culture., 29 However, they per-
ceive a society that is multilingual as disordered.30 By adopting an Official
English policy, society could become disciplined and unified. 31 Since advo-
cates of official English believe that the responsibility of government is to
advance the common good, they seek to unify the country by advancing Eng-
lish as the official language.32 Such a proclamation would promote "social,
political, and economic advancement; equality of opportunity for all; full
participation in the democratic process by informed voters; economic effi-
ciency and strength; [and] shared values and [make] national culture accessi-
ble to all.",33  Moreover, such a policy would compel assimilation into
American culture. 34 The English language, proponents maintain, is an ex-
pression of the liberty principles upon which the American society was
founded; 35 that is, to not learn English is a threat to the democracy in which
we live.
36
In the public sector, proponents contend that an Official English pol-
icy would be economical for courts, administrative agencies and public edu-
cation.37 In the courtroom, interpreters would no longer be one of the state's
costs, nor would publishing documents in any other languages. 38 Adminis-
trative agencies would no longer bear the expenses of recognizing non-
English speakers and accommodating them in order to use government pro-
grams.39 Lastly, 'bilingual education could be reduced or eliminated since
proponents assert that it is "wasteful government spending.,
40
At the private sector level, consumers might be more comfortable
understanding all that was communicated in their presence if businesses
were required to obey an English-only law.4'
Fortunately for linguistic minorities, groups such as The English Plus
Information Clearinghouse have countered the U.S. English movement since
1987.42 Highlighting the fact that the power of the United States lies in its
29. TATALOVICH, supra note 24, at II (citing U.S. English, U.S. English: Towards a Unified America
(Washington, D.C., n.d.).
30. BARON, supra note 4, at 27-28.
31. Id.
32. Id. See Michael DiChiara, Note, A Modern Day Myth: The Necessity of English as the Official Lan-
guage, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 101, 101-2 (1997).
33. TATALOVICH, supra note 24, at 11 (citing U.S. English, US. English: Towards a Unified America
(Washington, D.C., n.d.)).
34. BARON, supra note 4, at 27-28.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. PIATr, supra note 19, at 150,
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. DiChiara, supra note 32.
41. PIATT, supra note 19, at 150.
42. TATALOVICH, supra note 24, at 16-17.
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diversity, opponents to Official English relish the "unique reservoir of un-
derstanding and talent" within the diversity of the American population.43
Rather than establishing one official language, they seek to preserve cultural
pluralism. 44 Such pluralism, they declare, can only serve to boost competi-
tiveness and the United States' position of international hegemony. 45 Con-
versely, a country that remains monolingual in the global community may be
at a marked disadvantage.46
Overall, neither proponent nor opponent has won the battle. But as
states continue to pass Official English laws, the need to look at the rights of
linguistic minorities intensifies. Let us now turn to areas in which the right
to language has been recognized.
III. ESTABLISHED LINGUISTIC RIGHTS
A. Linguistic Rights in the Courtroom: The Right to An Interpreter
The constitutional right to an interpreter in a civil or criminal case
has not yet been addressed by the United States Supreme Court.47 In civil
cases, the right to an interpreter remains unrecognized.48 Although litigants
may opt to individually pay for the use of an interpreter, courts have not
found any basis for assigning them to defendants.4 9 Fortunately, in criminal
cases, decisions by lower courts, the Court Interpreters Act, and state agen-
cies have established the constitutional and statutory bases for such a privi-
lege. 50 Thus, the remainder of this section concerns only the right to an in-
terpreter in criminal cases.
Until three decades ago, the trial court judge generally held the dis-
cretion to appoint a courtroom interpreter in criminal proceedings. 51 Then in
1970, a constitutional basis for an interpreter was found by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in U.S. ex rel. Negron v. New
York.52
In Negron, the defendant was a twenty-three year old Puertan Rican
immigrant who worked in the U.S. as a potato packer. 53 When one of his
43. Id. at 17 (citing "Statement of Purpose, English Plus Information Clearinghouse," enclosure with form
letter to "Dear Friend" from Mary Carol Combs, director, n.d.).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Knapp, supra note 5, at 787.
47. PIATT, supra note 19, at 80.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 83.
51. Id. E.g., Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 91 (1907).
52. U.S. ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
53. Id. at 387-88.
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house-mates was fatally stabbed, Negron was charged with murder.14 He
possessed only a sixth-grade education and spoke only Spanish, with no
comprehension of English. 55 At trial, his court-appointed attorney, the trial
judge and the witnesses against him did not speak any Spanish.56 Moreover,
he never received a translation of the testimony against him even though an
interpreter was present during the four-day trial.57 Thus, on appeal, he
claimed that his right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment had been violated. 8
Recognizing that the holding would have great precedential value,
the court not only found a violation of Negron's rights but also explicitly set
out its reasons.5 9 To begin, the trial was unconstitutional for lack of ade-
quate translation.6 ° Clearly the Sixth Amendment, which guaranteed the
right be confronted with adverse witnesses and made applicable through the
Fourteenth Amendment, had been violated.6' The court then listed other
factors that forbade such a trial-fairness, the reliability of the fact-finding
process, the force of our adversary system, and adequate communication
between a criminal defendant and his lawyer. 62  In sum, the court pro-
nounced that "the least [it could] require is that a court, put on notice of a
defendant's severe language difficulty, make unmistakably clear to him that
he has a right to have a competent translator assist him, at state expense.
63
Without this assistance, the defendant would face a "trial" like Negron's, one
that was merely "a babble of voices. ' 64
The decision in Negron spurred forth the enactment of the Court In-
terpreters Act passed eight years later.65 Under its provisions, a district court
judge is required to use an interpreter in criminal or civil cases brought by
the United States. 66 If a party or witness is only or primarily fluent in a non-
English language, suffers from a hearing impairment that hampers communi-
cation or comprehension of the trial, or hinders understanding of testimony,
an interpreter must be assigned to the case.6 7 Interpreters are chosen from a
list determined by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
54. Id. at 387.
55. Id. at 388.
56, Id.
57. Id.
58, Negron, 434 F.2d at 389.
59. Id. at 387.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 389.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 390-91,
64. Negron, 434 F.2d at 388.
65. PIATT, supra note 19, at 82.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(c)(2) (2000).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b)(1).
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68States Courts. At the state level, statutes provide even broader rights to an
interpreter than the Court Interpreters Act.69
Overall, the right to an interpreter in the courtroom today has princi-
pally been established. While the right to an interpreter is no longer at the
discretion of the trial judge, he still retains control over whether a party is
entitled to an interpreter and how the interpreter is utilized during trial.70
B. Linguistic Rights in Education
Because of the continuous influx of immigrants, the education sys-
tem in the United States has traditionally incorporated bilingual instruction
into its curriculum. 71 Yet the right to a bilingual education, particularly sig-
nificant for non-anglophone children, is not protected by the Constitution.
In 1923, however, the Supreme Court recognized a critical right to education
in Meyer v. Nebraska.72 Moreover, several federal and state statutes have
been enacted to bolster these rights.73
In the nineteenth century, communities that held sufficiently large
immigrant populations could gather sufficient political pressure to insist
upon the preservation of their native culture and language.7 4 It was com-
monly thought that safeguarding native languages "would tend to soften the
abrupt transition from foreign to American ideas and ways to thought, and to
obviate the breakdown in parental control and discipline often observed in
immigrant families., 7 5 As a result, most public schools taught in English as
well as the dominant language of immigrants.7 6 Students learned English
concurrent with German, French or Dutch.77
When World War I erupted, however, nativist sentiments drove the
notion that immigrants ought to "Americanize" by learning to speak Eng-
lish.78 States began to pass laws to encourage "Americanization," requiring
immigrants to attend compulsory language classes.79 By 1921, twenty states
had enacted such statutes. 80 Among the laws passed was Chapter 249 of the
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b)(3).
69. PIATT, supra note 19, at 82. See id. at 82-83 for various state applications.
70. Id. at 83.
71. Amy S. Zabetakis, Proposition 227: Death for Bilingual Education, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 105, 106
(1998).
72. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
73. See infra Part II.B(3).
74. Zabetakis, supra note 71, at 107.
75. HERBERT ADOLPHUS MILLER, THE SCHOOL AND THE IMMIGRANT 38 (1916).
76. Zabetakis, supra note 71, at 107.
77. Id.
78. BARON, supra note 4, at 136.
79. See id. at 136-37.
80. Id. at 137.
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Nebraska Sessions Laws of 1919 which proscribed the teaching of foreign
languages to students before they finished the eighth grade. 8' A challenge to
the constitutionality of this statute would compel the Supreme Court to ad-
dress the rights of parents to direct the education of their children.
1. Meyer v. Nebraska:82 Right to Educate
On May 25, 1920, Robert T. Meyer taught German to a ten-year old
student named Raymond Parpart at the Zion Parochial School in Hamilton
county, Nebraska. 83 Meyer was found guilty of violating Chapter 249 of the
Nebraska Sessions Laws of 1919.84 The statute precluded him from teaching
a student who had not completed his eighth grade education in any other
language than English.85 As a result, Meyer was fined twenty-five dollars.86
Meyer proffered two defenses when he appeared before the Nebraska
Supreme Court.87  First, he argued that he was not teaching during school
hours.88 Second, he maintained that the statute unlawfully obstructed with
his right to choose and pursue a profession as well as the parents' right to
determine what their children would be taught.89
The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected Meyer's defenses and af-
firmed the lower courts' conviction.9" Its concurrence with the legislature's
resolution is a reflection of this "Americanization" period. In finding that
the statute was validly enacted under the state police power, the court re-
81. The statute provided that:
Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational,
parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any language than the
English language.
Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as languages only
after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced
by a certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in which
the child resides.
Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-
five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100), or be confined in the
county jail for any period not exceeding thirty days for each offense.
Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its pas-
sage and approval.
But see John J. Mahoney, Training Teachers for Americanization, in U.S. BUREAU OF EDUCATION BULLETIN
No. 12, at 15 (Government Printing Office, 1920) (advising that language teachers should not exaggerate the
effects of war hysteria).
82. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
83. Id. at 396.
84. Id. at 397.
85. Id.
86. Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100, 101 (Neb. 1922).
87. Id. at 100.
88. Id. at 103-104.
89. Id. at 101.
90. Id. at 104.
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marked that the purpose of the statute was apparent.9' It noted the "baneful
effects of permitting foreigners, who had taken residence in this country, to
rear and educate their children in the language of their native land. The re-
sult of that condition was found to be inimical to our own safety." 92 The
court further observed that children taught in the language of their immigrant
parents would "educate them so that they [would] always think in that lan-
guage, and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and sen-
timents foreign to the best interests of this country. 93
The United States Supreme Court overturned Meyer's conviction
on appeal. Finding the Nebraska statute arbitrary and with no reasonable
relation to any legitimate end, the Court declared it unconstitutional. 94 Its
reasoning plays a pivotal role in the educational arena.
To begin, the Court acknowledged that the notion of liberty was not
clearly delineated. 95 It did state, though, that liberty certainly included
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long rec-
ognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of hap-
piness by free men.
96
It then noted that education and the acquisition of knowledge have
always been regarded as "matters of supreme importance" by Americans.97
What Meyer did was merely part of his occupation as a teacher in further-
ance of those very goals. The Court first concluded that Meyer had a right to
teach. 98 Furthermore, the Court held that the parents had the right to instruct
Meyer on how to teach their children. 99 These two rights were "within the
liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment."' 0 0
Secondly, the Court observed that certain fundamental rights be-
longed to all individuals.'0 ' In particular, the Court noted that the Constitu-
91. Id. at 102.
92. Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. at 102.
93. Id.
94. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
95. Id. at 399.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 400.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 403.
101. Id. at 401.
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tion afforded protection "to all, to those who speak other languages as well
as to those born with English on the tongue."'
10 2
The Meyer decision effectively established both a right of teachers to
instruct and a right of parents to determine what their children would learn.
However, the Court did not reach the questions of an official-English policy
or of educating non-anglophones. In 1973, the Supreme Court would once
again encounter the issue of language rights, and this time, the Court would
face the right to language in the classroom.
2. Lau v. Nichols: 103 Right to a Meaningful Opportunity to Participate in
Education
In 1973, the California Education Code mandated that all children
between the ages of six and sixteen years had to attend school, and that to
graduate from grade twelve, the student had to demonstrate proficiency in
English.10 4 At that time, the San Francisco, California school system held
nearly 3,000 Chinese students who spoke little or no English. 0 5 Yet only
approximately 1,000 of those students received supplemental English
courses; nearly 2,000 students remained without any English-language in-
struction. 0 6 Among these 2,000 students was Kinney Kinmon Lau. 0 7 Suing
on behalf of approximately 2,000 non-English-speaking Chinese students,
Lau's guardian claimed unequal educational opportunities.'" The complaint
asserted that the San Francisco Unified School District violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.109
The Supreme Court held that the school district had violated the
rights of the non-English speaking Chinese students. 1° The Court first ob-
served that mere equality in school facilities was insufficient to produce fair
classroom experiences."' For the students who understood little or no Eng-
lish, any effective participation in the educational program was barred."
2
The Court recognized that California's policy in fact prevented the students
102. Id.
103. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
104. Id. at 566.
105. Id. at 564, n.I.
106. Id. at 564.
107. BARON, supra note 4, at 171.
108. Lau, 414 U.S. at 564.
109. Id. at 565.
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from having a meaningful education;1 13 the lack of supplemental education
made a "mockery of public education." ' 14 Thus, the Court rested its decision
only on § 601 of the Civil Rights Act, not on the Equal Protection Clause
claim. 115
While Lau did not plainly state that bilingual students have a right to
bilingual education, it did present a yardstick for a "meaningful" education.
For this reason, it has often been alluded to as the case that compelled bilin-
gual education. 116 Yet the Lau decision offered no particular method of pro-
viding bilingual education.'17 The Court only curbed the district's "sink or
swim" system to instructing children who had little English proficiency." 8
3. Statutory Protection
Following World War II, a remarkable upsurge of Spanish-speaking
children entered public schools. 19 By the 1960s, numerous groups pushed
for federal legislation to preserve the culture of these children while serving
their educational needs in English and Spanish. 120  As a result, federal and
state legislators enacted statutes that provided for non-anglophonic children.
The Bilingual Education Act of 1968 conferred grants to encourage
research to determine how to best assist children who had little or no profi-
ciency with English.'12  Two years later, the Health, Education and Welfare
Department endorsed a regulation under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that further protected linguistic rights in the classroom.122 The direc-
tive provided that a school district "must take affirmative steps to rectify the
language deficiency in order to open its instructional program" to students
who were excluded from effective participation because of their national
origin. 1
23
Following Lau, Congress codified the decision in its enactment of
the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, but it is imprecise in its
113. Id.
114. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566.
115. Id. Section 601 prohibits any discrimination founded upon "the ground of race, color or national
origin [in] any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d.
116. Zabetakis, supra note 71, at 107.
117. Lau, 414 U.S. at 569 (although the Court indicated that the school district could choose to teach Eng-
lish to the students or to teach the students in Chinese).
118. Id.
119. PIATT, supra note 19, at 42.
120. Id.
121. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3262 (1982).
122. PIATT, supra note 19, at 43.
123. Identification of Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg.
11,595 (1970).
2003]
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 29:2
recommendations. 124 The legislation mandates that schools take "appropriate
action" to meet the linguistic needs of students. 25 As a result, schools have
had little indication as to how best to educate their non-English speaking
students. 126  While language teaching techniques have advanced in the past
few decades, no method has proven to be accommodating. 127
At the state level, by 1990, twenty-three states had enacted bilingual
educational statutes. 128
Today, the critical right of minority language students to receive bi-
lingual education has been reasonably established. 29  The debate no longer
focuses on whether a right to bilingual education exists, but the extent to
which it does; 130 that is, the discussion now looks to whether education
should aim for assimilation or for pluralism.
131
IV. LINGUISTIC RIGHTS, SOCIAL SERVICES & ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Language rights in the arena of social services and administrative
agencies have typically been treated as one field of study by academics.
132
Yet, unlike the matters of courtroom proceedings and education, 33 the case
law in this area appears erratic-sometimes acknowledging a right to lan-
guage, other times upholding a regulation despite language discrimination. 134
124. Zabetakis, supra note 71, at 108.
125. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (stating that "no state shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin by . . . the failure by an educational agency to take
appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in instruc-
tional programs.").
126. Zabetakis, supra note 71, at 108.
127. BARON, supra note 4, at 174. See Zabetakis, supra note 71, at 109 (describing seven pedagogical
approaches to bilingual education).
128. PIATT, supra note 19, at 56-57 (noting that Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin had passed
such legislation).
129. Id. at 49.
130. Id.
131. Zabetakis, supra note 71, at 109 (citing Terri Lynn Newman, Comment, Proposal: Bilingual Educa-
tion Guidelines for the Courts and Schools, 33 EMORY L.J. 577, 580 (1984)). See PIATT, supra note 19, at 49.
132. See, e.g., PIATT, supra note 19, at 97-111; Brian L. Porto, Annotation, 'English Only " Requirement
for Conduct of Public Affairs, 94 A.L.R. 5th 537 (2001); Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 216-20.
133. See supra Part II.A-B.
134. Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding no right to interpreters before the state's
Department of Human Resources Development in order to attain unemployment insurance benefits); Frontera
v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding no right to interpretation in order to take an examination for
appointment as a carpenter); Guerrero v. Carlson, 512 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1973) (finding no right to notification in
Spanish when the state intended to terminate or reduce welfare benefits); Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz.
1998) (finding the state's English-only policy in government business violated the First Amendment and Equal
Protection); Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11 th Cir. 1999), rev'don other grounds sub noma. Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (finding the state's "English-Only" policy unconstitutionally discriminatory
against non-English-speaking applicants who failed to pass a driver's examination); Soberal-Perez v. Heckler,
466 U.S. 929 (1984) (finding discrimination by language, but no right to interpretive assistance before a Social
Security program).
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Upon inspection, cases that have involved social services like welfare or
unemployment benefits have not yet established a right to an interpreter.1 35
In spite of that, cases that have concerned administrative agencies have fared
more favorably, if not consistently. 136 It is my contention that these cases are
not in fact one category called "public affairs,"1 37 but constitute distinct sub-
jects warranting separate review.
A. Social Services
Under this split analysis, the trend of denying interpretive assis-
tance in social services appears reasoned. Social services like welfare and
unemployment benefits are granted by the state legislature. It is the legisla-
ture that fixes the conditions under which a person qualifies for the bene-
fits. 138 This power is only limited by constitutional guarantees such as pro-
cedural due process, and only when the state has chosen to reduce or termi-
nate benefits. 139 Giving due respect to state legislatures, courts no longer
"substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative
bodies, who are elected to pass laws."'' 40 Any procedure that is rationally-
based and is free of invidious discrimination will likely be upheld, despite
the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that the management of public wel-
fare assistance concerns the "most basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings.' 4' As a result, courts have consistently been unwilling to set
the terms of assistance by implying a right to language assistance. 142 Their
reluctance reflects the philosophy that the benefits of social services are
grants, not entitlements, from the state.
B. Administrative Agencies
At the same time, the twofold inquiry leads to a better understanding
of language rights in administrative agency cases. A cursory study of the
police power may help to illuminate why courts today are wrangling with
language rights in matters of administrative agencies.
135. E.g., Carmona, 475 F.2d 738; Guerrero, 512 P.2d 833; Soberal-Perez, 466 U.S. 929.
136. E.g., Frontera, 522 F.2d 1215; Sandoval, 197 F.3d 484.
137. But see Porto, supra note 132.
138. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473-74 (1970).
139. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
140. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
141. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485-87. See also Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973) (ex-
plaining that the provision English-only notices for unemployment benefits are a reasonable approach).
142. See Carmona, 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973); Guerrero v. Carlson, 512 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1973); Soberal-
Perez v. Heckler, 466 U.S. 929 (1984).
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State governments alone possess the police power. 143 Unlike the fed-
eral government, which depends upon the Constitution for its enumerated
powers, a state government may enact any legislation under its broad police
power, subject to the protections of the Constitution. 44 In 1887, the Su-
preme Court explained in Mugler v. Kansas that for legislation to be valid
under the police power, the statute need only to purport "to have been en-
acted to protect the public health, public morals, or the public safety, [to
have] no real or substantial relation to those objects, or [be] a palpable inva-
sion of rights secured by the fundamental law."' 145 Since then, legislation has
been held to a rational basis standard. 146
Under the rational basis test, the government holds a legitimate pur-
pose if the regulation promotes a traditional "police" purpose like protecting
safety, public health, or public morals. 47 Furthermore, the regulation should
reasonably fit the purported purpose. 148 To be held invalid, the statute would
need to be "clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, [and] not an exercise
of judgment."' 49 Consequently, the Supreme Court has seldom found a law
invalid under this test. 50 Yet, unlike the power to bestow social services, the
police power is limited by its purpose; however, to effectively balance the
state's need to protect public welfare against the individual interests, courts
may require legislative instruments to effect justice.
With the police power defined, let us now turn to the case law in the
area of linguistic rights in the context of administrative agencies executing
the police power. The Supreme Court has yet to address such a right; as a
result, we will examine cases that have been reviewed by circuit courts. As
we shall see, the area lacks a seminal case like Negron in the courtroom con-
text and Meyer and Lau in education.
1. Frontera v. Sindell: 15 1 No Right to Language
Frontera, a native of Puerto Rico who moved to Ohio when he was
twenty eight years old, served as a carpenter for the Cleveland Hopkins Air-
port under temporary appointment. 52 When the Civil Service Commission
143. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 282 (1997).
144. Id. at 166.
145. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
146. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 143, at 538.
147. Id. at 536.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 541 (citing Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640 (1937)).
150. Id. at 535.
151. Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1975).
152. Id. at 1216.
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of the City of Cleveland announced that it would hold examinations for the
skilled crafts, Frontera sought to have both the written and oral sections of
the examination for carpenter permanent appointment translated into Span-
ish. 153  Despite the Commission's assurances, a Civil Service employee
failed to translate the test and Frontera was forced to take the examination in
English.154 Unfortunately, Frontera failed the examination; as a result, he
did not receive the certification.15 5 He subsequently filed a class action suit
against the Civil Service Commission of the City of Cleveland and the
Commissioner of Airports. 5 6 Claiming that his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985 had been violated, he
asked the court for damages and injunctive relief. 57
The District Court held that the Commission had a right to conduct
the examination in only English under the "compelling interest" test.
58
While the court acknowledged that there was a discriminatory effect on the
Spanish-speaking population of the city, 159 it noted that the state had met its
burden of establishing a "compelling interest" to justify its procedure.' 60 On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. the lower court's decision, but remarked
that the court should have employed an even lower standard of review, the
rational basis test, because the case did not involve a suspect nationality or
race. 161
The Civil Service Commission's purported interest in administering
the test in English was to maintain the successful operation of the Civil Ser-
vice system.162 The Sixth Circuit agreed. 63 The Commission further as-
serted that an English-only examination would effectively eliminate incom-
petent carpenters.' 64 With this the court also agreed. 65 While the court
agreed with the state's assertion, it also recognized that there was a lack of
training for carpenters, and still expected that in the course of experience,
applicants would have mastered the proper terminology. 66 It held that "[a]t
the very least, use of such terminology would not ordinarily interfere with
153. Id. at 1216-17.
154. Id. at 1217.
155. Id. at 1216.
156. Id.
157. Frontera, 522 F.2d at 1216.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1217-18 (finding that not one of the city's 574 craft positions was held by the city's 545 Span-
ish-speaking craftsmen).
160. Id. at 1218.
161. Id. at 1219.
162. Id.






the test's objective of identifying competent carpenters and ranking them for
Civil Service."' 67 And even if the test did not match its purpose well, there
remained merit in holding civil service tests as a general matter.1
68
[A] test, even one the cutoff of which does not demonstrably pre-
dict job performance, may serve worthwhile goals in gross by sift-
ing from the pool of potential applicants those without enough mo-
tivation even to try to acquire the skills the test demands, and by
discarding some few candidates who take the test but whose mental
ability is so low that they are obviously unsuitable. Finally, it is
virtually impossible for an employer to justify to a mathematical
certainty every selection. 1
69
In sum, the court held the administration of an English-only exami-
nation to a rational basis standard. It found a legitimate purpose, and a rea-
sonable fit between the English-only examination and the state's purpose of
maintaining a successful Civil Service system and ascertaining competent
carpenters. Yet, what is troublesome is the court's callous disregard for
those who might have been competent for the certification but failed because
of the language of the examination.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no "state [shall] deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."' 70 In
1897, the Supreme Court construed the liberty of this amendment to "em-
brace the right of citizen[s] to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to
be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or voca-
tion ... ,,1' Furthermore,
[while the Court] has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty . . . the term has received much consideration and some of
the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it
denotes ... the right of the individual ... to engage in any of the
common occupations of life ... and generally to enjoy those privi-
leges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of hap-
piness by free men.1
72
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1218-19.
169. Frontera, 522 F.2d at 1219 (citing Boston Chapter N.A.A.C.P., Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1022
(Ist Cir. 1974)).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
171. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
172. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
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In the Frontera case, the plaintiff sought to pursue his livelihood of
carpentry. He endeavored to labor as a carpenter with permanent appoint-
ment. He prepared to take the examination that was required for the ap-
pointment. His quest, however, was thwarted by the rules of the Commis-
sion that bestowed the certification. Its English-only administration of the
examination precluded Frontera from satisfying the examination. One must
question, then, whether the Commission's English-only rule was valid under
the police power. That is, one must query whether the rule was adopted to
protect the public health or safety or if it was a display of arbitrary power
and not an application of judgment.
On the one hand, the Commission sought to identify competent
craftsmen. It deemed the terminology of carpentry necessary to the trade,
terms such as "beading work" or "factory or shop lumber."' 173 Since such
terms could only be learned through experience, the Commission presumed
that such vocabulary testing would distinguish the experienced, competent
carpenters from the applicant group. If the knowledge of carpentry-related
vocabulary were indeed correlated to the aptitude of the carpenter, then the
English-only administration of the test seems sensible. The English-only
rule ensured that the Commission would appoint only carpenters who would
adequately serve public health and safety. Therefore, the rule validly existed
under the state police power and Frontera was fairly denied certification.
On the other hand, the courts acknowledged that Frontera was a car-
penter with "substantial skill."' 174 He was a member of the Carpenter's Un-
ion local based on an oral test and an inspection of his carpentry work. 175 He
had previously been employed as a carpenter under temporary appointment,
and had understood the work orders, blueprints, verbal instructions, and
sketches of his post. 176 In sum, he had "competently performed his job."'177
One might argue that the English examination did not test his craftsmanship,
skill or competency. Had the test been translated into Spanish, it is feasible
that Frontera could have passed the test. What disqualified him, then, from
being certified as a carpenter permanent appointment was the language of
the examination. Furthermore, one might say that the Commission's choice
to administer the test in English was not an exercise of judgment. Its policy
resulted in English-speaking, not competent, carpenters. The Commission's
policy was merely a display of power; it provided the test as it did because it
173. Frontera, 522 F.2d at 1217.






held the authority. As a result, one could conclude that the English-only
administration was an invalid exercise of the police power.
It appears, though, that English was necessary to the execution of the
job. While the circuit court's opinion did not specify the responsibilities a
carpenter permanent appointment held, the position was one of the highest
paid posts in the city. 178 It is realistic to expect that such a position would
require the use of English in everyday affairs to be efficient and effective.
The Sixth Circuit observed that the examination did not require any verbal
ability that was outside the scope of carpentry. 179  That is, the test did not
require a general proficiency in the English language.' In sum, "the test
was job related."' 18' Thus, the administration of the test in English only, un-
der the rational basis test, was a fair application of the police power.
The question, then, is whether an administrative agency may admin-
ister a test in English only when English is not vital to the post. We now
turn to Sandoval v. Hagan182 to examine whether a state's English-only pol-
icy which dictated that a driver's license examination be given in English
only was a fair use of the state police power.
2. Sandoval v. Hagan: Right to Language?
On July 13, 1990, the state of Alabama adopted an English-only
amendment to its constitution. 83  Amendment 509 declares English as the
official language of the state. 184  One year later, the Department of Public
Safety enacted an English-only policy pursuant to Amendment 509: All
driver's license examinations would be conducted in English. 85  Martha
178. Id.
179. Frontera, 522 F.2d at 1217.
180. Id. at 1218.
181. Id. at 1220.
182. 197 F.3d 484 (1 lth Cir. 1999), rev'don other grounds sub nom, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275
(2001) [hereinafter SandovaIl].
183. Id. at 487-88.
184. Id. Amendment 509 proclaims:
English is the official language of the state of Alabama. The legislature shall enforce
this amendment by appropriate legislation. The legislature and officials of the state of
Alabama shall take all steps necessary to insure that the role of English as the common
language of the state of Alabama is preserved and enhanced. The legislature shall make
no law which diminishes or ignores the role of English as the common language of the
state of Alabama.
Any person who is a resident of or doing business in the state of Alabama shall have
standing to sue the state of Alabama to enforce this amendment, and the courts of record
of the state of Alabama shall have jurisdiction to hear cases brought to enforce this pro-
vision. The legislature may provide reasonable and appropriate limitations on the time
and manner of suits brought tinder this amendment.
ld. at 488.
185. Id. at 488.
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Sandoval challenged this policy in 1996.186 A permanent resident alien from
Mexico, Sandoval spoke and understood very little English, and could not
read English well. 187 In a class action suit, she claimed that the Depart-
ment's practice amounted to discrimination based on national origin under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4, and
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.188 She sought a declaratory judgment for unlawful
and unconstitutional practice and a permanent injunction of the English-only
testing. 189
The district court granted the injunction. 190 It found that the Depart-
ment had intentionally discriminated against applicants based on national
origin and ordered the Department to "fashion proposed policies and prac-
tices for the accommodation of Alabama's non-English-speaking residents
who seek Alabama driver's licenses.' 191 While the Department's policy was
an exercise of police power and might have been reviewed under the rational
basis test, because the claim had asserted a violation of equal protection, the
district court held the policy to a higher standard.
192
The State proffered six justifications for its English-only driver's li-
cense examinations: "(1) Amendment 509's requirement, (2) highway safety
concerns, (3) administrative accommodation concerns, (4) exam integrity
concerns, (5) funding concerns, and (6) English is the official language of
the United States."' 193 The court generally rejected the State's justifications,
finding that none were "substantial legitimate justifications" for the dis-
crimination. 194 Neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the appellants disputed the
district court's findings. 195
The State failed to prove its assertion that non-English-speaking
drivers were more dangerous because they lacked fluency in English. 196 In
fact, the Chief of the Department Driver's License Division from 1978 to
1987 testified that he saw no such correlation during his tenure. 197 More-
over, the State defeated its rationale by recognizing the licenses of non-
186. Id.
187. Id. at 490.
188. Sandoval I, 197 F.3d at 487.
189. Id. at 488.
190. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d. 1234, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
191. Sandova II, 197 F.3d at489.
192. Id. at 510.
193. Id. at 490.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 490-91.
197. Sandoval l, 197 F.3d at 490.
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English-speaking drivers from other states.198 The Department also made
special accommodations for groups like the illiterate, deaf, and disabled that
"might pose theoretically greater safety risks."' 99
The court also found the concerns for examination integrity "merit-
less., 200 For more than ten years, from the 1970s to 1991, the Department
had offered the examination in fourteen foreign languages, "including Span-
ish, Korean, Farsi, Cambodian, German, Laotian, Greek, Arabic, French,
Japanese, Polish, Thai, and Vietnamese., 20 1 No difficulty had arisen from
the multi-lingual administration of the driver's license exam.20 2
Lastly, the district court discarded the notion that the Department
could not stay within its budget if it accommodated non-English-speaking
applicants. 0 3 Before the enactment of Amendment 509, the Department had
acquired its translations of the examination by using volunteer translators.2 °4
It had cost the State nothing to obtain the examinations, and it did not appear
to cost the State anything to use them again. 20 5 Furthermore, even if the De-
partment were constrained by its budget, the court remarked that applicants
ought to have been permitted the option of providing for their own transla-
tors.206
In sum, Sandoval sought to be licensed as a Class D driver in Ala-
bama. Her pursuit was frustrated, however, by the State and Department's
adoption of an English-only policy. Pursuant to the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the district and circuit courts recognized that the De-
partment's practice was unconstitutional. The administration of the examina-
tion in English only was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause for dis-
crimination. Yet the significance of this case should not be overstated.
While Sandoval did hold that an English-only policy was unconstitu-
tional, it did not vindicate the right to minority languages.20 7 The circuit
court simply found that the impact of the rule was so heavily visited upon a
suspect classification of national origin that it violated the equal protection
of the law. It conceded that the Supreme Court has never held that language
might act as a proxy for national origin protection in equal protection claims
and that "existent case law [is] unclear" on the matter. 20 8 Thus, while the
198. Id. at 490-91.
199. Id. at 491.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 487.
202. Id. at 491.




207. Garza, supra note 21, at 381.
208. Sandoval ll, 197 F.3d at 509.
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outcome was dissimilar.to that of Frontera, Sandoval resembles Frontera in
spirit: neither case found a constitutional right to a minority language in an
administrative agency context.
One should note, though, the different correlations between language
and licensed skill in the two cases. In Frontera, the link appeared reason-
able. It was sensible that to be qualified for one of the city's highest paid
positions, an applicant ought to be able to understand the terms of the car-
pentry and to be proficient in the English language. A successful applicant
would in part be proving his qualification for the occupation by taking the
examination in English. The facts of Sandoval hardly seem analogous. The
correlation between language proficiency and the ability to drive safely
seems tenuous at best.
Consider that states administer driver's license examinations to en-
sure that safe drivers operate vehicles. Driving, after all, requires little more
than an elementary grasp of how to operate a car safely. Traffic signs are
erected to be identifiable by their words, shape, and color. For example,
drivers understand a "STOP" sign by its printed word, the octagonal shape of
the sign, and the sign's red background and a white border. That is to say,
an applicant need not be able to read English to drive safely. Requiring non-
English-speaking applicants to take the test in English is in essence requiring
them to prove their qualification for driving by demonstrating their ability to
read English. The fact that Alabama permitted illiterate persons to become
licensed drivers underscores how superfluous it is to administer the test in
English only. Unlike Frontera, non-English-speaking applicants are pre-
cluded from being licensed when the language of the examination is largely
unrelated to the licensed activity.
That one can become licensed in a skill by examination currently
does not translate into access to the examination in a language of choice,
regardless of how pertinent knowledge of the English language may be. The
effect of the resulting practices of administrative agencies may be consider-
able. In Alabama alone, it was estimated that nearly 13,000 adult residents
"would have difficulty in obtaining an Alabama driver's license because of
the Department's English-only policy" in 1998.209 As of April 2000, half of
the country had adopted English-only laws.21 °
If, in the future, the English-only policies of other states are not
found to violate the Equal Protection Clause, and their subsequent licensing
regulations are reviewed as an exercise of the state police power under a
209. Id. at 489.
210. See Garza, supra note 21, at 379 n.2 (citing Katherine Kapos, Education Board Demurs on English-
Only, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 12, 2000, at B 1, available at 2000 WL 3757810).
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rational basis test, it is my forecast that other courts will join in the judg-
ments of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. That is, courts will defer to the
state's legislated English-only policy. Applicants who seek licenses that do
not require English fluency, but are forced to take the English-only tests, will
be barred from the activity.
If the courts cannot protect this non-English-speaking population,
these potential applicants may be prohibited from any licensed activity
unless a remedy is provided for by the state legislatures. Since this is an
emerging area of law within the United States, it may be prudent to look
beyond our borders at other countries that boast multi-lingual societies. It
may be instructional to examine how countries like Ireland, with dual offi-
cial languages, conduct administrative certification procedures that balance
the state's promotion of official languages and the applicant's linguistic
qualifications for the certification.
V. LOOKING TO AN IRISH MODEL
Article 8 of the Irish Constitution (Bunreacht nah Eireann) declares
the official languages of the country:
1. The Irish language as the national language is the first official
language.
2. The English language is recognized as a second official lan-
guage ....
While a minority of the population speaks Irish fluently,212 the gov-
ernment of Ireland has continually preserved and promoted the use of Irish
as a mark of national identity since the 1950s. 213 In 1979, the Minister of
Education disseminated a regulation that was consistent with the country's
policy of promoting Irish.214 Circular Letter no. 28/79 required that all per-
manent full-time teachers hold the Ceard-Teastas Gaeilge, a certificate of
proficiency in Irish. 2 5 The circular made special provisions for applicants
from foreign countries and for appointees who had not obtained the certifi-
cate.216
In 1982, Anita Groener, a Dutch national, served as an art teacher
under temporary appointment at the College of Marketing and Design in
211. Groener v. Minister for Educ. and City of Dublin Vocational Educ. Comm., [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 401,
414 (1990) (Ir.).
212. Id. at 405.
213. Id. at 405, 414.
214. Id. at 414.
215. Id. at 411.
216. Id. at 411-12.
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Dublin, Ireland.2t 7 She sought to be appointed as a permanent lecturer in art
at the college two years later.218  While she passed the remainder of the ap-
plication process, Groener failed to satisfy the linguistic requirement of Cir-
cular Letter 28/79.219 She was consequently not appointed. 220 Thus, Groener
filed a suit against the Irish Minister for Education and the City of Dublin
Vocational Education Committee. 2 ' She claimed that the regulations of the
circular were in violation of Article 48 EEC and Regulation 1612/68.222
Without reaching the question under Article 48 EEC, the Court of
Justice of the European Communities reviewed the meaning of Article 3(1)
of Regulation 1612/68 which established that administrative practices cannot
be designed to exclude "nationals of member-States away from the employ-
ment offered. '' 223  The Article provided an exception to the rule, though; the
provision was not applicable to provisions "relating to linguistic knowledge
required by reason of the nature of the post to be filled., 224  The court ob-
217. Groener, 1 C.M.L.R. at412.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 411-12.
220. Id. at 411.
221. Id. at 412.
222. Groener, 1 C.M.L.R. at 412. The treaty states that:
I. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community by the end
of the transitional period at the latest.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remunera-
tion and other conditions of work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the
provisions governing the employment of nationals of that state laid down by law, Regu-
lation or administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that
state, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implementing Regulations to be
drawn up by the Commission.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public service.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Aug. 31, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 20 (1992) [hereinafter "Art.
48 EEC"].
1. Under this Regulation, provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative ac-
tion or administrative practices of a Member State shall not apply:
- where they limit application for and offers of employment, or the right of foreign
nationals to take up and pursue employment or subject these to conditions not applica-
ble in respect of their own nationals or
- where, though applicable irrespective of nationality, their exclusive or principal aim
or effect is to keep nationals of other Member States away from the employment of-
fered.
This provision shall not apply to conditions relating to linguistic knowledge required by
reason of the nature of the post to be filled.
Council Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 On Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the Commu-
nity, art. 3, 1968 O.J. (L257) 2.
223. Groener, I C.M.L.R. at 413.
224. Id.
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served that the teaching of art in public vocational education schools was
primarily, if not wholly, held in English.225 It even noted that knowledge of
the Irish language did not appear necessary for the position of art lecturer.226
While the finding seemed to lead to a result in favor of Groener, the court
persevered in defining what constituted the "nature of the post to be
filled."
227
Reviewing the import of Article 8, the court held that the Education
Minister's conditions listed in Circular Letter no. 28/79 were consistent with
the public policy of endorsing the Irish language. 228 Teachers, performing an
"essential role" in society, were deemed a critical intermediary to realize the
public policy.229 To impose upon them a requirement of knowledge of the
Irish language was a logical means to achieve the state goal.2 30 The court
thus found the circular's provisions "reasonable." However, it conditioned
its holding;23' that is, the imposition on teachers was sound "provided that
the level of knowledge required [was] not disproportionate in relation to the
objective pursued ... [and the knowledge of the language] be regarded as a
condition corresponding to the knowledge required by reason of the nature
of the post to be filled.
232
In many ways, the facts of the Groener case parallel the circum-
stances of Frontera v. Sindell and Sandoval v. Hagan.233 In both situations,
the state boasted a multi-lingual society, but enjoyed an official language
policy. The official language was not merely symbolic, but a policy genu-
inely pursued by the government. Moreover, agencies under the authority of
the government had the power to implement regulations as they saw fit. In
both cases, applicants did not hold the requisite knowledge to pass the ex-
23
amination. 23 Consequently, none of the applicants received the certification
23
necessary for the appointment. Yet between the starting point of an offi-
cial language policy and the courts' conclusions lies the difference between









233. See supra Part III.B(I)-(2).
234. Groener, I C.M.L.R. at 411-12; Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1975);
Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 490 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
235. Groener, 1 C.M.L.R. at 411; Frontera, 522 F.2d at 1216.
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Whereas the U.S. regulation was viewed as a valid exercise of the
police power and reviewed under the rational basis test, the Irish regulation
was viewed against a larger background. That is, the Sixth Circuit simply
looked for a legitimate state purpose for its English-only administration, and,
finding some rational fit between its English-only examination and the prof-
fered purpose, held the English-only procedure valid.236 In contrast, the
European court closely scrutinized the state purpose as well as the right of
the applicant to express himself.237 The court balanced the importance of the
state's official language with the applicant's right to language. Because the
promotion of the Irish language was judged to be a prevailing public policy,
after weighing both sides, the European court held that the circular's condi-
tions were valid.238
While the European court's balancing approach may provide an in-
teresting model of judicial thought for American academics to muse, it is of
limited applicability in the United States because of customary standards of
review in American courts. Moreover, given the established nature of
American court analysis, it is unlikely that any foreign country's judicial
approach will be constructive. However, Groener's value extends beyond
the European court's balancing approach. The court, more pertinently, em-
ployed a principle of proportionality to evaluate the regulation in Groener.
239
Under the principle of proportionality, the language requirement
must pursue an objective. 2 4 0 Furthermore, the requirement must be necessary
to attain that objective.241 With these two factors present, the principle of
proportionality is met; conversely, if the requirement is not proportionate to
achieving the goal, or unnecessary for the certification, the regulation is
likely invalid.242 In Groener, the court recognized that use of the Irish lan-
guage was virtually non-existent in the course of teaching art; in fact, it ac-
cepted that "knowledge of the Irish language [was] not required for the per-
formance of the duties., 243 Yet the requirement that applicants have knowl-
edge of the Irish language in order to receive the appointment was upheld.
Employing the principle of proportionality, the court recognized the
state goal in promoting the Irish language. 244 The requirement was devised
236. Frontera, 522 F.2d at 1219.
237. Groener, 1 C.M.L.R. at 414.
238. Id.
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to advance the Irish language as a source of national identity and culture.245
And given that teachers occupy a particular niche in society, the court found
that "some knowledge of the first national language" was a reasonable re-
quirement for teachers in order to receive the permanent appointment.246
The "level of knowledge required [could merely not] be disproportionate...
to the objective pursued., 247 In other words, the level of language required
by the state had to be proportionate to the role in society that teachers
played. In the case of Groener, the principle of proportionality gave due
consideration to promoting the state's official language policy and to pro-
tecting the individual's right to pursue her appointment.
In sum, the principle of proportionality offers a reasoned balance be-
tween state and individual rights. Rather than forcing a court to focus on the
rights of one side, the approach affords protection to both sides in a rational
manner. The court can proceed toward a resolution with appreciation for the
appeals of both sides and can conclude with equity. The regulations that are
upheld under this principle are likely to be fair to the state's police power
and to the applicants who seek certification. The public welfare will be pro-
tected at the same time that the linguistic rights of applicants are respected.
It is this principle of proportionality that may offer guidance in the arena of
linguistic rights in the administrative agency context. Had this principle
been employed in the U.S. cases of Frontera and Sandoval, perhaps the rea-
soning of the cases would have led to more consistent outcomes.
In the case of Frontera, application of the principle of proportional-
ity would likely have revealed that the regulation requiring all examinations
for carpenter permanent appointment to be held in English was proportionate
to the post. On the one hand, the state sought to promote the use of English
to ensure a thriving Civil Service operation and to certify competent carpen-
ters for the position.248 Moreover, the post of carpenter permanent appoint-
ment was one of the highest-paid positions in the city. On the other hand,
Frontera could only receive the certification by taking the examination, and
the English-only regulation precluded him from taking the examination in
any other language than English.249 Employing the principle of proportional-
ity, it would seem that some degree of English fluency would be required for
the appointment and would further the city's goal of preserving the smooth
operation of the Civil Service system. Thus, the English-only examination
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sum, the level of linguistic knowledge required of the applicant would be
proportionate to his position in society.
Applying the principle of proportionality to the case of Sandoval, a
court might find that the requisite level of English for the driver's license
examination was disproportionate to the licensed skill. Among the several
rationales offered, the state sought to certify only competent drivers. °
However, the State had failed to prove that non-English-reading drivers were
more dangerous than those who could comprehend the English language.251
Moreover, the State permitted illiterate applicants to take an oral driver's
license examination in place of a written test; it would suggest that the abil-
ity to read English was hardly necessary to drive competently.252 Thus, the
level of linguistic knowledge required of the applicant to pass the driver's
license examination was disproportionate to the skill of driving.
In fact, under the principle of proportionality the state's interest in
certifying competent drivers would have been balanced against the individ-
ual's right to be licensed in a language she understood. As a result, the level
of linguistic knowledge required by the state would have been proportionate
to the skill of driving. Certainly, one cannot state that driving is a skill
without a linguistic component. Some degree of English fluency would
likely be appropriate in qualifying for a driver's license. Therefore, perhaps
an examination that contained the critical elements in English and the re-
mainder in the language of choice would have better suited the requisite
level of language for safe driving.
VI. FROM LEGISLATION CAME PROPORTIONALITY
Having reviewed Ireland's approach to linguistic requirements for
certification by an administrative agency, it is imperative to note that the
European court was able to employ its principle of proportionality because
of the language of Article 3(1) of Regulation 1612/68.253 That is, the legisla-
ture had specially removed those conditions that related to the "linguistic
knowledge required by reason of the nature of the post to be filled" in Art.
3(1) of Council Regulation 1612/68 from the protection of discrimination
254based on nationality. Without this phrase, it is unlikely that the court
would have considered the relationship between Groener's position and the
250. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 490 (11 th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
251. Id. at 490-91.
252. Id. at 491.
253. Groener v. Minister for Educ. and City of Dublin Vocational Educ. Comm., [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 401
(Ir.).
254. Id. at 403-05.
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level of language required for the post that she sought. It is by this legislated
exception that American state legislatures ought to be guided.
At the present, the area of linguistic rights in the context of adminis-
trative agencies in the U.S. is perplexing. In an increasing number of states,
official English clauses have been amended to state constitutions. Adminis-
trative agencies, acting under their delegated authority, have adopted regula-
tions that follow these amendments. Furthermore, courts, bound by their
state constitutions and unable to find a federal right to language, have been
powerless to give remedy to non-English-speaking plaintiffs who seek certi-
fication by the state. The principle of proportionality that is so valuable to
the European court is only constructive if an American court has a means by
which to employ it. Drawing from the Irish experience, perhaps it is time for
American state legislatures to make provisions for their non-English-
speaking constituents similar to the exception in Ireland's Regulation
1612/68.
Rather than enacting the simple notion that English shall be the offi-
cial language of the state and that all state affairs shall be conducted in Eng-
lish, the legislature might consider appending to its official English amend-
ment the concept that the law should not apply to provisions that "by reason
of the nature of the post to be filled '' 255 require lower levels of linguistic
knowledge. By attaching this exemption, the right to minority languages of
non-English-speaking applicants will be respected and their liberties will not
be constrained by arbitrary, unrelated linguistic requirements.
Administrative agencies will be empowered to assign the requisite
levels of English fluency proportionate to the various certifications. By
gauging the level of language fluency required to perform a licensed skill,
agencies in "exemption" states will be better able to ensure that competent
applicants are certified. Moreover, courts in "exemption" states will have
the necessary statutory language to employ the principle of proportionality.
They will have the means by which to weigh the policy goals of the states
against the right to certification in one's native language. Courts will no
longer be bound to strike down only those regulations that are "clearly
wrong" under the police power, but those that are inequitable as well. With
this exemption, in other words, courts will be given the power to administer
justice.
255. Art. 48 EEC.
[Vol. 29:2
2003] State Official English Laws 281
VII. CONCLUSION
As it stands, the Constitution protects most people within the borders
of the United States. Yet some remain without its security. For those who
live in the U.S. and cannot, because of administrative agency regulations,
obtain certification to pursue their livelihood or their happiness, the Consti-
tution fails to guard their liberties. Yet these are the very people who consti-
tute so insular and discrete a minority that the political process, too, fails
them. It is high time that state legislatures recognize the linguistic rights of
their non-English-speaking constituents. Using Ireland as a model, state
legislatures have much to gain from the Irish experience. They hold the
power to rectify this unfortunate situation facing non-English speakers. By
enacting an exception to the official English statute, the protection of the
Constitution will be extended to another group of American residents.

